As flourishing, productive open source software (OSS) communities mature, they have to introduce a variety of governance mechanisms to manage the participation of their members and to coordinate the launch of new releases. In contrast to other modes of governance of OSS communities, the Debian community introduced new mechanisms of informal administrative control based on a constitution, elected leaders and new functions attributed to interactive communication channels (like mailing lists or IRC channels) that can provide for community effects (and feedback). We show that these control mechanisms were introduced as a response to emerging innovative opportunities due the usage of source packages and heterogeneous learning processes by different groups within the Debian community,
Introduction
The continuing fascination with open source software (OSS) communities has led to an explosion in the number of volunteers working in Open Source Software (OSS) communities. The continuous growth of these communities in combination with the increased demands on the open software community has, however, created mounting problems for these same communities in terms of organization and governance. The traditional ways of organizing these communities have proved to be unable to cope effectively with these conditions of exponential growth.
In OSS communities, the creation of new knowledge requires, on the one hand, a set of organizational rules and structures that allow critical evaluation of existing knowledge, innovation and rapid elimination of error (Kogut, 2000) . On the other hand, the growing need of the open software community reduces the time available for the introduction of new releases while requesting a high quality of new releases (Michlmayr, 2004) . Due to this dilemma, the organizational forms to coordinate and govern collaborative work have to be flexible and should be able to adapt easily to organizations (Franke and von Hippel, 2003 , Lee and Cole, 2003 , Moon and Sproull, 2000 . In contrast to other OSS communities, the Debian case shows that an OSS community can develop new governance mechanisms in the face of increasing technical and structural complexity from a "great person" in charge (Moon and Sproull, 2000) to informal administrative control mechanisms based In the following we briefly characterize the theoretical discussion on changes in organizational structure and governance of OSS communities during their transition from the "going open" to the "growth" stage (Lameter, 2002) . Afterwards, we focus on describing different governance mechanisms in the Debian OSS community after the initial founder, Ian Murdock, left the project in March 1996 . In using data triangulation, the analysis utilizes a variety of data sources to characterize perspectives of different stakeholders on the governance forms within the Debian OSS community. In this piece we try to answer our main research question of how alternative governance mechanisms have revolutionized an OSS community such as Debian. Finally, we conclude with a brief discussion of our findings.
Mature OSS Communities and their Governance Forms
Open source software (OSS) communities are characterized by distinctive features such as a) a shared common interest of members communicating through the Internet without face-to-face contact (Hertel et al., 2002 , Rheingold, 2002 ; b) active pursuing of collective innovation and production processes (Hemetsberger, 2002) ; c) members bound together by shared as well as complementary expertise, which makes it possible to manage complex projects (Hertel et. al, 2002) ; and d) are based on reciprocity on the group level as individuals adding code (or providing for other activities) to the group project, receive something from the group in return (for instance other code or bug reports). In contrast to collaborations, OSS communities are less restrictive in their access policy, relying on referral or reputation and develop a more specific community code including sanctions for violating this code. Furthermore, they are less flexible compared to collaborations with respect to change of members in the community. Compared to project based teams OSS communities are less clearly defined and less stable with respect to boundaries, functions, roles, and norms. They are more similar to "communities of practice" (Wenger & Snyder, 2000) which emerge based on "informal and self-organizing" mechanisms and "benefit from cultivation". However, to sustain these "communities of practice", they have to managed (Wenger & Snyder, 2000) .
For OSS communities, a critical growth stage is reached at the moment they are moving from the project initiation stage to the stage of "going open" (Rasters, 2004, Schweik and Semenov, 2003 (Ouchi, 1979) . Organizational life cycle theorists have shown that the internal structure of organization is changing by going through different growth stages (introduction, growth, maturity or decline).
At these stages, appropriate governance mechanisms have to be found that can deal with increasing technical and structural complexity otherwise organizations decline. This discussion, rooted in original contributions by Blau (1970 and Woodward (1965) , has
shown that organizations cope with increasing technical and structural complexity by increasing differentiation and formalization as well as by employing a larger administrative component.
In coping with growth, OSS communities have deployed a wide variety of differentiated task structures with different degrees of formalized technical as well as administrative structures. The formalization of the technical and administrative structures has been driven by the needs within the OSS community to explore and 10 exploit knowledge leading to a parallel code structure of the open source software project (Lee and Cole, 2003) . The evolution of these tasks structures and formalized structures also required different forms of governance within OSS communities. OSS communities have struggled most with the increasing complexity of the software and the explosion in the number of contributors to the community. This makes coordination in OSS communities a critical issue that separates successful from un-successful communities.
To deall with the increased need for coordination within OSS communities, Demil and Lecocq (1999) have shown that the bazaar structure, i.e. a "great babbling bazaar of different agendas and approaches" (Raymond, 2001) , can serve as a new emerging mode of governance within the OSS community (Demil and Lecocq, 1999, Raymond, 2001) . Even under conditions of very high uncertainty, the bazaar mode of governance assures coordination based on reputation effects that are induced by the community phenomenon.
However, in the face of increasing technical and structural complexity of OSS communities, the bazaar mode of governance does not prove to be efficient enough to account for the increased need for administrative (informal as well as formal) control mechanisms and provides less incentives for effective production compared to other modes of governance. As a result, a number of mixed forms of bazaar governance have emerged ranging from quasi-hierarchical (Linux) to (kind of) centralized (Apache) approaches (Demil and Lecocq, 1999) . For an overview about these different modes of governance of OSS communities see Lynne Markus et al (2000) . As we will show below, a unique mixed approach of bazaar governance has been developed within the Debian OSS community.
3
Governance mechanisms in transition: The Debian OSS community
Characterizing the Debian OSS community
The Debian OSS community has experienced a rapid growth since its establishment in 1993 by Ian Murdock involving currently more than 900 volunteer package maintainers.
However, the Debian OSS community differs from others because the programming work within the community is not concentrated on producing code, but on integrating code into a coherent system. In this respect, Debian is more in line with Red
Hat, SUSE and Mandriva than with the Linux kernel, Apache and Mozilla (Bauer and Pizka, 2003 , Gonzáles-Barahona et al, 2004 , Narduzzo and Rossi, 2003 . Therefore, two separate code structures (trees) that are running in parallel can be identified (a stable and a more experimental version of Debian software) but vital has been the integration of both trees. The stable version of Debian has been focused on the package system (dpkg). The experimental version served as a test bed for new features of (public) releases of Debian.
This focus on integration of code has also been important to understand the emerging different task structures within Debian compared to other OSS communities.
The task structure of the Debian community has been focused around a "core" which consists of the Debian project leader (DBL),
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developers as well as a "periphery" of maintainers. As the "core" is responsible for the production of new code, the periphery deals with the integration of these codes for particular applications. This structure differs from other OSS communities like Linux (Lee and Cole, 2003) as it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between them. 6 Examining the specifics of the code structure used by the Debian OSS and the evolving task structure is essential to the understanding of the development of the different informal governance forms within the Debian OSS community. 
Organizational Growth and the Emergence of Informal Forms of Governance The Project Initiation Stage
In the project initiation stage, OSS projects commence because one or more people realize that there is a computing-related problem or challenge left unfilled, and for one or more reasons, they decide to take it on (Godfrey and Tu, 2000) . Here the "itching problem"
described by E. Raymond comes into play: "every good work of 6 However, there is a spectrum between integrators and code producers rather than a clean line of separation. For instance, many Debian developers are involved in troubleshooting other projects' code, writing patches and "upstream" work. Similarly, Red Hat employs the key developer of the GNU project's C library and Novell employs key GNOME, mono developers and kernel developers specializing in particular hardware platforms. 7 It furthermore is important to know that the Debian OSS community has not been influenced by strategies of sponsoring companies. Other OSS communities are (still) operating in other market segments (like Ubuntu in the desktop market and in the individual user segment) or specific markets (like Mandriva) and do not software starts by scratching a developer's personal itch." (Raymond, 1998) . At that point it is important to reach programmers who think along with this new initiative. Motivation, "the kernel," and a modular design are three important components of this stage of an OSS project (Schweik and Semenov, 2003) . Even if there is an increasing number of studies that have focused on the motivation of programmers to take part in OSS communities (Hertel et al, 2003) , parallel. This modularity also enables the project leader to keep better control over the project when the work progresses (in complexity) (Rasters, 2004) . These three components can also be found in the initial phase of the Debian OSS community. forms of governance. To achieve project and product credibility, the project needs to obtain support from a number of enthusiastic "core developers", to show some "plausible promise" (i.e., a high development potential of the kernel in conjunction with an existing enthusiastic programmer community of high reputation), to attract interest from programmers due to its innovativeness, to have some importance while allowing a (future) large number of developers to
participate, and to demonstrate that the right amount of the problem has already been solved before the project becomes "open." (Schweik and Semenov, 2003 had the function to experiment and to further improve on public releases as they were used as a learning device. To account for this experimental tree of development and to include new innovative opportunities, the Debian OSS community has developed later a whole cycle of releases ranging from an 'unstable' over a 'testing' to a 'stable' package. Table 1 provides an overview of Debian releases and major events during this second phase.
Insert Table 1 about here
As can be seen in Table 1 First, as virtual construction sites they were used to continuously create, update, modify and repair software constructs; second, as some sort of electronic crossroad they were used to exchange information and problems as well as discuss solutions, and third, as a form of weblog they recorded the history of the Debian OSS community. The mailinglists allowed unrestricted access to discussions, allowed knowledge circulation and have been a means to structure the communication within the Debian community. At the same time they allowed dissemination activities of the Debian project to take place quasi-automatically, because documentation of built software products or solutions can circulate throughout the web almost instantaneously. The dissemination process has been linked to the development activity, and has been embedded in the Internet-based information and communication structure. As a result of these new functions, mailinglists were considered as a new mechanism of governance within the Debian OSS community (Lanzara and Morner 2003: 37) .
A continuous problem of management of the Debian OSS community has been the slow release cycle of Debian. The Debian project had often to defend itself on this matter. The Debian community has always been proud of the fact that it will not release buggy software, and will release only when the software has been stable. Within the Debian OSS community, the Debian project leaders developed their own leadership style to deal to problems of slow release management and for the growth of the community as a whole. As Table 2 personal election platforms to election debates on IRC channels.
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Insert Table 2 about here Scud proposal has been a source of some concern, especially how it would integrate within the Debian constitution and the existing organizational structure. 12 The discussion on the mailinglists shows that members of the Debian community got confused by the DPL team idea. They argued that the DPL can always delegate tasks to other members of the project and therefore the argument of Scud In exploring the different stages in the development of OSS communities, the paper has linked the evolution of different informal governance forms within the Debian OSS community to the particular parallel code structure utilized and the task structure within this community. Even if separate code structures running in parallel can be identified within the Debian OSS community (i.e. a stable and a more experimental version of Debian software), the integration of both structures has proved to be vital.
The task structure of the Debian community differs from other OSS communities like Linux (Lee and Cole, 2003) In order to characterize governance mechanisms during transition of OSS communities, we examined the history of the Debian OSS community based on data triangulation. As this method involves the use of different sources of data/information (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998, Marshall and Rossman, 1999) , it allows to characterize the different perspectives of stakeholders within the Debian community like Debian project leaders, maintainers or 43 developers. It also enabled us to get an understanding of specifics of the Debian community compared to other OSS communities.
To examine, in more detail, the development of the Debian OSS community, a wide variety of data sources were consulted:
Primarily we used internal documents related to the content and context of different Debian projects. We complemented the analysis with semi-structured interviews (both face-to-face and by telephone) with key individuals (DPL leaders, maintainer, developers) during the period 2002 -2005.
Similar to Dafermos (2001) , we used semi-structured interviews as they provide more detailed information of greater value than straightforward question and answer sessions, especially when the research is explorative (Dafermos, 2001 ). These semistructured interviews were also useful in engaging in a continuous conversation with the interviewees. The face-to-face interviews were taped and transcribed verbatim. As a check, the interviews were sent to the interviewees for comments. The interviews that were undertaken by telephone were written down as accurately as possible. Again, the transcripts were sent to interviewees in order to check their accurateness. The enormous willingness of participants to contribute to this research, e.g. by interviews and e-mail interaction has been remarkable in particular in the Netherlands.
Debian developers were very supportive and helpful and always willing to travel to participate in interviews. Even developers from 44 other places in the world said that they would help, however as one of them remarked: "Of course, I'm willing to contribute, but when I detect 'cluelessness' from the side of the researcher, I will invest my time in something else."
Furthermore, we attended several Debian conferences and were "lurking around" on the Debian mailinglists, websites, IRC channels, etc. We identified the Debian-devel(opment) mailinglist, as it is the most important (the "head" mailinglist) of the project, and we analyzed a few threads of messages on the Debian-devel mailinglist. Interviews were used to gain further insights into the Debian community. In addition, articles on Slashdot.org, members' biographical writings and diaries, previous interviews with key members and descriptions of the community written by other researchers and key people were extensively utilized. After having established initial contacts, a kind of network of participants developed. Members of the community pointed out: "You could ask this member about that," or, "I know someone who can help you with that." In that way we were introduced to most interviewees and important contributors to the Debian project. Several pages on the Debian homepage also pointed out key people in the Debian project. Based on this approach, we met diverse programmers, from the inner circle to newcomers on the project, which made the range of responses quite broad. In addition, we posted an overview of this case study on one of the Debian mailinglists and asked 45 people for comments; this also brought us in touch with members of the community. A draft of the case was send to Debian members, who provided additional (and valuable) comments. As a result we were able to follow the Debian project in great detail with respect to its history as well as its ongoing development and activities.
This methodology enabled us to characterize the growth of the Debian OSS community as a process in which not only a differentiated role structures emerged that both reflected and supported its activities but different forms of governance were implemented.
